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THE RIGHT OF SUBSEQUENT CREDITORS TO SET
ASIDE A FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
The common law courts were unable to relieve creditors from
the effects of fraudulent conveyances because a writ of execution
would only permit levying upon property where the legal title was
in the judgment debtor. Although the courts of equity might
have by gradual development alleviated this situation, they were
not given the opportunity to try their hand. Rather than entrust
their problem to these courts the English merchants directed their
pleas for relief to Parliament which resulted in the enacting of the
Statute of 13 Elizabeth, similar to the statutes in many states to-
day, declaring any conveyance void made by a debtor with intent
to delay, hinder or defraud his creditors or others.' In West Vir-
ginia the modern counterpart of this statute is found in the Re-
vised Code of 1931.2
A subsequent creditor, which the phrase "or others" has been
construed to include,3 is obviously one to whom the debtor is not
indebted at the time of the conveyance. In many states, a tort
claim does not constitute a debt until reduced to judgment4 nor
does a contingent liability on a contract create a debt ;r however,
in West Virginia it is not necessary that any creditor reduce his
claim to a judgment before he can invoke the aid of the statute,6
because our statute does not base the right entirely upon the theory
that the fraud is upon the creditor's right of realization. Never-
theless, the distinction between prior and subsequent creditors still
has far-reaching results as applied to the facts necessary to bring
these two classes of creditors within the operation of the statute.
It has been well settled by statute7 and the courts8 that exist-
ing creditors have the right to set aside a mere voluntary convey-
1 GLENN, CzROITORS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1915) 49-69.
2 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 40, art. 1, § 1.
3 GLENN, op. cit. supra n. 1, § 70. However some courts have held the word
"creditors" to include subsequent creditors. Hagerman v. Buchanan, 45 N.
J. Eq. 292, 17 Atl. 946 (1889) ; Home Life & Accident Co. v. Schichtl, 169 Ark.
415, 287 S. W. 769 (1926).
4 Exp. Mercer, 17 Q. B. D. 290 (1886).
5 GLENN, Op. cit. supra n. 1, at §§ 221, 72.
0 Kinnison v. Scott, 82 W. Va. 287, 95 S. E. 952 (1918) ; Thomas v. Lupis,
96 W. Va. 100, 122 S. E. 365 (1924).
7 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 40, art. 1, § 3.
sLockhard & Ireland v. Beckley, 10 W. Va. 87 (1877); Greer v. O'Brien,
36 W. Va. 277, 15 S. E. 74 (1892) ; Arnold, Abney & Co. v. Slaughter, 36 W.
Va. 589, 15 S. E. 250 (1892) ; McCue v. McCue, 41 W. Va. 151, 23 S. E. 689
(1895); Manufacturing Co. v. Carr, 65 W. Va. 673, 64 S. E. 1030 (1909);
McCaskey, Trustee v. Potts, 65 W. Va. 641, 64 S. E. 908 (1909).
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ance, not supported by a consideration deemed valuable in law,
but such right is not eitended to the subsequent creditors unless
there is a fraudulent intent shown. Prior to this statute there was
some diversity of opinion as to whether such a conveyance was
prima facie fraudulent upon existing creditors which prima facie
intent was rebuttable or void as to those creditors irrespective of
any fraud.' However this statute has supplanted all such diversity
and the conveyance is now held to be void as to existing creditors.10
Any discussion concerning the rights of subsequent creditors
necessarily raises the question whether or not there were any ex-
isting creditors at the time of the conveyance because, in fact, debts
usually exist at the time of these conveyances. The cases generally
hold that where the conveyance is made in mala fides and there are
existing creditors, the subsequent creditors may successfully im-
peach the conveyance whether the fraudulent intent relates to the
existing creditors or exclusively to the subsequent creditors."
There is some authority to the effect that subsequent creditors may
set aside a conveyance only when the fraudulent intent was specifi-
cally directed at them. A few courts have held that a conveyance
fraudulent as to existing creditors is presumptively fraudulent as
to subsequent creditors.' West Virginia has in several cases up-
held the majority rule.13
The problem of subsequent creditors successfully attacking a
fraudulent conveyance in the absence of any prior or existing
creditors is not separate and distinct from the problem of attack
by them where there are such prior and existing creditors, but can
be distinguished only by the degree of proof necessary to show
the requisite fraud to vitiate the conveyance. On the contrary
there is no difficulty where the case concerns merely the rights of
subsequent creditors to share in the distribution of assets after the
conveyance has been set aside.14 The express fraudulent intent
may, but need not, appear by direct and positive proof; circum-
stantial evidence is not only sufficient but in most cases is the only
9 See discussion by Judges Baldwin and Stanard in Hunters v. Waite, 3
Gratt. 26 (Va. 1846).
10Su pra n. 8.
21 Hutchinson v. Kelly, 1 Rob. 131 (Va. 1842); Lockhard & Ireland v. Beck-
ley, 10 W. Va. 87 (1877); Silverman v. Greaser, 27 W. Va. 550 (1886); (1916)
12 R. C. L. 495, 496, § 27.
12 (1928) 22 ILL. L. Rzv. 673.
13 Supra n. 11; also Rine v. Compton, 188 S. E. 483, 485 (W. Va. 1936).
14 Foley v. Ruley, 50 NV. Va. 158, 40 S. E. 382 (1901).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1937], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol43/iss3/6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
available proof. The test seems to be that if the facts and circum-
stances are of such a character as to show the requisite intent to a
reasonable man they are sufficient. 15
The usual so-called "badges" of fraud are: gross inadequacy
of price ;16 no security taken for the purchase money ;"? unusual
length of credit for the bonds which have been taken at long per-
iods ;" threats and pendency of suits ;" concealment of the trans-
actions which relate to the conveyances ;"' failure to aclnowledge
and record for a considerable time ;21 remaining in possession by
the grantor as before the conveyance upon which the creditor re-
lied;22 the immediate engagement in a hazardous business ;23 and
the contracting of debts immediately after the transfer." Any of
the above "badges" may constitute a prinua facie case of fraud re-
quiring the debtor to explain the transaction, except that a subse-
quent creditor to succeed in avoiding the conveyance must show
more than a mere voluntary conveyance and an existing indebted-
ness.
25
Therefore it seems reasonable to conclude that the rights of
subsequent creditors to set aside such conveyances in the absence
of prior or existing indebtedness depends solely upon whether the
facts and circumstances of each case show a fraudulent intent as
- Lockhard & Ireland v. Beekley, 10 W. Va. 87 (1877); Martin & Gilbert v.
Rexroad, 15 W. Va. 512 (1879) ; Burt v. Timmons, 29 W. Va. 441, 2 S. E. 780
(1887) ; Bronson v. Vaughan, 44 W. Va. 406, 29 S. E. 1022 (1898) ; Stauffer v.
Kennedy, 47 W. Va. 714, 35 S. B. 892 (1900).
16 Wood v. Harmison, 41 W. Va. 376, 23 S. E. 560 (1895) ; Foggin v. Fur-
bee, 89 W. Va. 170, 109 S. E. 754 (1921); Schiffler v. Kissel, 103 W. Va. 545,
138 S. E. 107 (1927).
17 Hiekman v. Trout, 83 Va. 478, 3 S. E. 131 (1887).
18 Ibid.
19 Butler v. Thompson, 45 W. Va. 660, 31 S. E. 960 (1898); Sizemore v.
Lambert, 78 W. Va. 243, 88 S. E. 839 (1916).
20 Fishel v. Lockhard & Ireland, 52 Ga. 633 (1874); Hilliard v. Cagle, 46
Miss. 309 (1872).
21 Beeckman v. Montgomery, 14 N. J. Eq. 106 (1861); Case v. Phelps, 39
N. Y. 164 (1868); Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 299 (1823); Bank of
Alexandria v. Patton, 1 Rob. 499 (Va. 1843).
22 Carter v. Grimshaw, 49 N. H. 100 (1869).
23 Cramer v. Reford, 17 N. J. Eq. 367 (1866); Case v. Phelps, 39 . Y. 164
(1868); Mullen v. Wilson, 44 Pa. 413 (1863); Williams v. Davis, 69 Pa. 21
(1871); 2 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 642.
24Herselhfeldt v. George, 6 Mich. 456 (1859); City National Bank v.
Hamilton, 34 N. J. Eq. 158 (1881); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 25 N. J. Eq. 194
(1874). However the time intervening between the date of the conveyance and
the creation of the debt is material to show an injury to the subsequent cred-
itors. Lee Hardware Co., Ltd. v. Johnson, 132 Ark. 462, 201 S. W. 289 (1918).25Supra n. 8.
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to such creditors. If no such intent can be discovered to the satis-
faction of the court in view of the "conflicting interests ' 2 in-
volved they cannot prevail.
M. B. L.
E. W. E.
26 Note (1924) 37 HAZv. L. REv. 489, 492. The conflict of the debtor's
interest to use and dispose freely of his property against the subsequent cred-
itor's interest to secure adequately his claim.
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